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Catherine L. Fisk and Michael J. Wishnie
The Story of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:
Labor Rights Without
Remedies for Undocumented
Immigrants
Are there two sets of rules for the twenty-first century workplace,
one for citizens and legal immigrants and the other for the six million
undocumented workers in the United States? Are the employers of those
undocumented workers free to ignore the mandates of the National
Labor Relations Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and other
federal and state labor and employment laws, without fear of ordinary
liability?
To an immigration lawyer, familiar with immigration law’s ‘‘plenary
power doctrine’’ and the notion of an ascending scale of rights that
privileges legal immigrants over undocumented ones, the intuitive an-
swer might be, ‘‘of course; there are frequently different rules for
immigrants and citizens, and for legal immigrants and the undocu-
mented.’’1 Undocumented workers are non-citizens who are neither
lawful permanent residents nor have an immigration status authorizing
them to work in the U.S. and thus have fewer legal rights. To a labor
lawyer, familiar with labor law’s embrace of collective action and private
rights enforcement to achieve public deterrence, the instinctive response
1 See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770–771 (1950) (‘‘The alien, to whom
the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and
ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.’’); Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67 (1976) (approving discrimination in public benefits eligibility between citizens
and permanent residents).
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might be, ‘‘of course not; there are no statutory exceptions to labor law
coverage based on immigration status, and the fate of all workers
depends on the treatment of each.’’ Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB is a tale of the efforts of unions, employers, civil rights advocates,
legislatures, executive branch agencies, and ultimately the Supreme
Court to reconcile the immigration and labor statutory schemes, to make
sense of the sometimes contradictory legislative impulses these twin
regimes manifest, and to develop a framework for the humane and
effective regulation of both borders and markets.2
In important ways, laws regulating our nation’s borders and its
labor markets share a common ancestry that traces to early colonial
rules on slavery, the slave trade, and indentured servants. Although
modern lawyers are accustomed to thinking of ‘‘labor law’’ and ‘‘immi-
gration law’’ as wildly disparate, proposals for mammoth new guest-
worker programs, ‘‘earned’’ legalization, and a new paradigm for U.S.-
Mexico relations reflect the deep connections between these two bodies
of law. This common heritage is apparent as well in the competing
political pressures embodied in both schemes—at times and in places
protectionist, nativist, bigoted, and designed to favor the interests of
management; at other times and in other places open, non-discriminato-
ry, universalist, and designed to favor the interests of working people.
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB five justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court viewed the labor and immigration laws as fundamentally
at odds with one another. The majority held that an employer who
unlawfully discharges a worker for union organizing is immune from
ordinary labor law liability for backpay if the worker lacks work authori-
zation under immigration law and the employer learns of the worker’s
status only after the illegal discharge. Four justices viewed the labor and
immigration laws as fundamentally in harmony. In dissent, they would
have allowed the National Labor Relations Board to enforce its backpay
award, notwithstanding an immigration law that prohibited employers
from knowingly hiring or employing unauthorized workers.
Hoffman will not be the last word on labor rights for immigrants
and labor obligations for their employers. It remains to be seen whether
the decision helps spur broader legislative reform, strengthening the
right to organize for all workers and thereby reducing an incentive for
outlaw employers to prefer undocumented employees, or whether it
instead promotes an already-flourishing underground economy and
thereby stokes the demand for illegal immigration.
2 535 U.S. 137 (2002). One author of this chapter, Michael Wishnie, participated in the
Hoffman case at the court of appeals and Supreme Court and has been involved in
legislative efforts to respond to it. Some references later in this chapter to the Hoffman
litigation strategy and legislative responses to the Court’s decision are drawn from his
knowledge.
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Social Background
The Hoffman case was litigated over thirteen years amidst three
important social and legislative developments. One occurred in the labor
movement, one in Congress, and one in the population as a whole.
First, by the time the Supreme Court decided Hoffman in 2002, the
union movement had significantly withered, representing only approxi-
mately 8.5% of private-sector, non-agricultural employees. This was only
a fraction of union density in the post-World War II era and a figure so
low as to raise fundamental questions about the capacity of unions to
protect the interests of working people. To labor advocates this was
especially discouraging because John Sweeney had assumed the leader-
ship of the AFL–CIO in the mid–1990’s with a pledge to reinvigorate
moribund organizing campaigns. Organized labor appeared largely un-
able to attract enough new members or to win elections in numbers
substantial enough to halt, if not reverse, a decades-long decline.
Perhaps not coincidentally, through the 1990’s and into the new
century, organized labor’s attitudes towards immigration continued to
reflect, in large measure, traditional fears that immigrants would work
for lower wages than long-time residents and thus drive down wages.
There were important exceptions to this attitude, such as successful
organizing drives targeting high-immigrant industries initiated by un-
ions such as SEIU and HERE, the AFL–CIO Executive Council’s adop-
tion of a pro-immigrant resolution in February 2000, and the Immigrant
Worker Freedom Ride of 2003.3 It was also true that labor organizers
increasingly found low-wage immigrant workers more receptive to
unionization drives, despite the risk of deportation, than low-wage
American workers, and a number of unions came to perceive organizing
immigrants as essential to their success.4 Nevertheless, concerned about
the impact on wage levels of large numbers of new workers, and perhaps
maintaining a residual nativism, important voices within the labor
movement remained unpersuaded of the wisdom of legalizing undocu-
mented workers and repealing the employment verification system that
the AFL–CIO had endorsed when enacted by Congress in 1986.5
3 Among the important organizing initiatives targeting immigrant-intensive industries
were SEIU’s Justice for Janitors campaign, HERE’s hotel industry campaigns in Las Vegas
and elsewhere, and health care worker drives in California and New York. The AFL–CIO’s
February 2000 Executive Council statement, which advocates legalization measures and
‘‘replacing’’ the I–9 employment verification system that was at issue in Hoffman, is
available at ¢http://www.aflcio.org/aboutaflcio/ecouncil/ec0216200b.cfm$. In 1986, the
AFL–CIO had supported adoption of the same system.
4 Telephone Interview with Muzaffar Chishti, Senior Policy Analyst, Migration Policy
Institute and former Director, UNITE Immigration Project, June 3, 2004.
5 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, § 101(a)(1), 100
Stat. 3359 (Nov. 6, 1986), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000).
TCBI
T
T
T
FNS
FNS
FNS
05035099w01wLT05.COOPER.TXT.RVwINITIALwFPCOOPw2/4w9:24wRev. 7.1 (TOS)
Job Name COOPERTXwJob# 47364wReg# 0-2930-7wPg Ranges (1,399)wPg# 354
354 THE STORY OF HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC. v. NLRB
Second, in the 1990’s, as Hoffman worked its way through the
National Labor Relations Board, Congress enacted and President Clinton
signed three major anti-immigrant laws. The legislation slashed the
public benefits eligibility of millions of indigent immigrants and their
families, mandated detention and deportation for tens of thousands of
permanent residents, and restricted traditional forms of deportation
relief such as political asylum.6 The human consequences of these bills
were dramatic. The draconian Welfare Act of 1996, for instance, sought
to achieve nearly one-half of its estimated savings through elimination of
benefits for immigrants, even though far fewer than half of welfare
recipients were non-citizens.7 And the numbers of permanent residents
deported for past criminal convictions, often minor, rose significantly,
separating tens of thousands of long-time residents from their families,
jobs, and communities.8 The net effect of these laws was also significant-
ly to increase the risk for immigrant workers of participating in a union
organizing drive. For undocumented workers, deportation in the event of
a retaliatory employer call to INS became more certain, and for legal
immigrants, the availability of a social safety net—public benefits—in
the event of a retaliatory discharge became far less likely. The trend
towards ever-more punitive immigration laws continued following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, although perhaps paradoxically,
the USA PATRIOT Act, Homeland Security Act, and other major post-
September 11 legislation have effected far less sweeping changes to the
immigration statutes than did the 1996 laws.
Third, despite the indifference of some in the labor movement
towards immigrants, and despite the adoption of numerous harsh stat-
utes in the 1980’s and 1990’s, the number of noncitizens in the country
increased substantially. From 1970 to 2000, the overall foreign-born
population in the United States tripled, to 28.4 million persons.9 While
6 These laws were the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104–132, Title IV, 110 Stat. 1214; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, §§ 400–451, 110 Stat. 2105; and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
208, Division C, 110 Stat. 3009–546.
7 The Congressional Budget Office estimated that $23.7 billion of the anticipated $53.4
billion in federal savings from the 1996 welfare law would be attributable to the anti-
immigrant measures. Cong. Budget Office, Federal Budgetary Implications of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, at 3 tbl. 2 (1996).
Congress did subsequently restore some benefits. See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105–33, 111 Stat. 251 (restoring Supplemental Security Income benefits for
some legal immigrants).
8 In 1986, INS removed fewer than 2,000 immigrants because of past criminal
convictions, a figure that rose to approximately 71,000 persons with criminal convictions
removed in 2002. 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, at 176–77 & tbl 46 (Oct. 2003).
9 U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of the Foreign–Born Population in the United States:
2000 (Dec. 2001), at 3. ‘‘Foreign born’’ refers to persons who are not U.S. citizens at birth,
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record figures in absolute terms, as percentages of the overall popula-
tion, they are not: in 2000, 10.4 percent of the population was foreign-
born, the highest proportion since 1930, but from 1860 to 1930, the
percentage of foreign-born was higher still.10 The increase in the non-
citizen population was more dramatic, however, rising from 3.5 million
in 1970 to 17.8 million in 2000.11 Data on the undocumented population
are notoriously imprecise, but estimates have risen from approximately
five million persons in the mid–1990’s to perhaps ten million in 2004.12
Nationwide, a large and crucial segment of the workforce is undocu-
mented. Driven by a remarkable ninety-six percent labor-force partic-
ipation rate for undocumented men, there are approximately six million
undocumented immigrant workers, representing five percent of the total
workforce (including four percent of the urban workforce and forty-eight
percent of the agricultural workforce).13 An employer group estimated in
2001 that immigrants (both legal and undocumented) contribute $1
trillion per year to the Gross Domestic Product and account for twelve
percent of total
hours worked in the U.S.14 Not surprisingly, undocumented workers
are concentrated in some of the lowest-paying and most dangerous jobs
in the country.15
By the time the events giving rise to Hoffman Plastic occurred, the
effect of immigration on the California workforce had been dramatic. In
and includes those who have become U.S. citizens through naturalization and those who
remain non-citizens, including lawful and undocumented immigrants. Id. at 8.
10 Id. at 9 & Figure 1–1. The proportion was 13–15% in 1860–1920 before falling to
11.6% in 1930.
11 Id. at 20 & tbl. 7–1.
12 The INS estimated the undocumented population to be five million persons as of
October 1996 and seven million as of January 2000, U.S. INS, Estimates of the Unautho-
rized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990–2000 (2003), but other
demographers have concluded the total undocumented population may be closer to eleven
million. See Jeffrey S. Passel, Randy Capps, & Michael Fix, Undocumented Immigrants:
Facts and Figures (2004) (estimating undocumented population at 9.3 million); Cindy
Rodriguez, Census Bolsters Theory Illegal Immigrants Undercounted, Boston Globe, Mar.
20, 2001, at A4 (noting estimates ranging from six to eleven million persons).
13 Jeffrey S. Passel, et al.[format requires all names of authors] Randy Capps, &
Michael Fix, Undocumented Immigrant: Facts and Figures 1 (2004); Orrin Bair, Undocu-
mented Workers and the NLRA: Hoffman Plastic Compounds and Beyond, 19 Labor
Lawyer 153, 160 (2003) (citing How Many Undocumented: The Numbers Behind the U.S.-
Mexico Migration Talk, PEW Hispanic Center 3 (May 21, 2002)).
14 Id. (citing Immigration Is Critical to Future Growth and Competitiveness, Employ-
ment Policy Foundation, Policy Backgrounder 1 (June 11, 2001)).
15 Jeffrey S. Passel, et al. [format requires all names of authors] Randy Capps, &
Michael Fix, Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures 2 (2004).
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many of the state’s industries, including manufacturing, construction,
and service work, wages and working conditions had deteriorated after
employers eliminated or weakened unions in the 1970’s and native
workers were increasingly replaced by immigrants. Nearly one-fourth of
the state’s population was foreign-born (compared to one-tenth in the
United States as a whole). Foreign-born Latinos constituted seventeen
percent of California’s total workforce, and forty-two percent of its
factory operatives, one-half of its laborers, and over one-third of its
service workers.16 The dominance of Latino workers was especially
apparent in Southern California, where the Hoffman Plastic plant was
located.
The greater Los Angeles area has a substantial amount of light
manufacturing.17 Most of it is concentrated in an old industrial area, the
Alameda Corridor, which lies between downtown Los Angeles and the
ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. Less than ten percent of the
manufacturing jobs are unionized and a majority of the workers are
Latino. Many workers live in Alameda Corridor communities, thus
creating the possibility of using community and religious organizations,
kinship bonds, and neighborhood and ethnic ties as well as workplace
solidarity to forge a union.18
Legal Background
The legal background to the Hoffman case reflected some of these
social developments as well. The NLRB had taken the position since at
least the late 1970’s that undocumented immigrants were ‘‘employees’’
covered by the National Labor Relations Act.19 As employees, undocu-
mented workers who were fired for union organizing would be entitled to
the full range of remedies under the NLRA. The Board normally orders
reinstatement and backpay from the date of discharge until the date of
reinstatement, issues a cease-and-desist order proscribing similar mis-
conduct in the future, and orders the employer to post a notice announc-
ing the Board’s decision and promising to abide by it. The NLRB
requires employees to mitigate damages by seeking interim employment.
Therefore, a backpay award may be reduced by wages an employee
16 David Lopez & Cynthia Feliciano, Who Does What? California’s Emerging Plural
Labor Force in Ruth Milkman, ed., Organizing Immigrants (2000).
17 Marla Dickerson, L.A. County Leads U.S. in Factory Jobs, L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 2004,
at C2.
18 Hector L. Delgado, The Los Angeles Manufacturing Action Project: An Opportunity
Squandered? in Ruth Milkman, ed., Organizing Immigrants (2000).
19 See, e.g., Duke City Lumber Co., 251 NLRB 53 (1980); Apollo Tire Co., 236 NLRB
1627 (1978), enf’d, 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979); Amay’s Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 NLRB
214 (1976); Hasa Chemical, Inc., 235 NLRB 903 (1978).
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earned in interim employment or, if the employee failed to make reason-
able efforts to find employment, by the amount he or she would have
earned. Eligibility for backpay depends on the employee being available
for work, and, therefore, a backpay award will be reduced for any period
during which the employee is unavailable for work, as for example, when
she or he is in jail or out of the area of the employer’s operations. The
Board will not order reinstatement if the employee engaged in miscon-
duct so egregious as to make him or her unfit for reinstatement, or if the
employer shows that at some point after the unlawful discharge the
employee would have been terminated in any event. Interest will be
computed on a backpay award.20
In 1984, the Supreme Court endorsed the view in Sure–Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB that undocumented workers are ‘‘employees’’ within the meaning
of the NLRA.21 In Sure–Tan, an employer contacted the INS shortly after
his employees voted in a union. The INS visited the factory and investi-
gated the immigration status of all Spanish-speaking employees. The
INS arrested five and, by the end of the day, all were on a bus ultimately
bound for Mexico. The Board found that the employer, with full knowl-
edge that they were undocumented, invited the raid solely because the
employees supported the union. The Board ordered reinstatement with
backpay, leaving for the compliance hearing the question whether the
deported workers were available for work, a requirement for backpay
eligibility. On review, the court of appeals held that six months was a
reasonable period to believe the discriminatees would have been em-
ployed absent the employer’s unfair labor practice and modified the
Board’s order to award a minimum of six months’ backpay. The Su-
preme Court upheld the Board’s conclusion that undocumented immi-
grants are statutorily protected as employees under the NLRA. The
Court explained: ‘‘Application of the NLRA helps to assure that the
wages and employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely
affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject
to the standard terms of employment.’’ But the Court reversed the court
of appeals’ mandatory minimum backpay award as too speculative.
Recognizing that the discharged employees would receive no backpay
because they were deported the very day they were fired, the Court
nevertheless rejected the contention that the Board has the power to
order minimum backpay regardless of an employee’s particular circum-
stances. Specifically, the Court was concerned that enforcing the Board’s
backpay award could undermine ‘‘the objective of deterring unautho-
rized immigration that is embodied in the [immigration statutes].’’ Thus,
20 On general NLRB remedies in unlawful discharge cases, see 2 Patrick Hardin &
John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law 2521–2529 (4th ed. 2001).
21 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
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in providing directions for remand, the Court stated that remedies
‘‘must be conditioned upon the employees’ legal readmittance to the
United States’’ and that ‘‘in computing backpay, the employees must be
deemed ‘unavailable’ for work (and the accrual of backpay tolled) during
any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and
employed in the United States.’’
At the time Sure–Tan was decided, it was not unlawful for an
undocumented immigrant to be hired or to work in the United States;
under the immigration laws, all that was prohibited was entering with-
out inspection or remaining beyond the term of one’s visa. Seizing on
this point, as well as the Supreme Court’s attention to the physical
unavailability of the workers in Sure–Tan, the Ninth Circuit, the first
court of appeals to consider a question left open in Sure–Tan—the
backpay eligibility of undocumented workers who remained in the coun-
try after discharge—determined that such workers were in fact eligible.22
Two years after the Sure–Tan decision, however, and only months
after the Ninth Circuit had held that workers in this country were
eligible for backpay regardless of their immigration status, Congress
enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). IRCA
embodied a bargain struck between legislators who favored increased
immigration enforcement and those who favored a legalization program.
The bill’s two key provisions were, first, a one-time amnesty for those
who could demonstrate continuous residency since 1982, and second,
adoption of the ‘‘employer sanctions’’ provisions, which for the first time
prohibited employers from knowingly hiring or employing ‘‘unauthorized
workers.’’23 Employer organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce opposed the employer sanctions provisions as a costly, burden-
some, and inefficient strategy to compel the private sector to enforce
public immigration laws. The AFL–CIO, on the other hand, endorsed
employer sanctions in the hope they would reduce wage competition by
deterring employment of undocumented immigrants.
The 1986 law defined ‘‘unauthorized alien’’ as a non-citizen who
was not, at the time of employment, either a lawful permanent resident
or authorized to work—in other words, undocumented immigrants,
whether they have overstayed a visa or entered the country without
inspection, as well as those persons holding non-immigrant visas that did
not allow employment.24 IRCA did not create penalties for unauthorized
22 Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB (Felbro), 795 F.2d 705
(9th Cir. 1986) (wrongfully discharged undocumented worker who remains in country
eligible for backpay).
23 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2000).
24 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2000) (defining ‘‘unauthorized alien’’ for purposes of em-
ployer sanctions). Many visas, including those for tourists and some students, do not carry
work authorization.
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workers who accepted employment; instead, Congress chose a scheme of
civil and criminal penalties for employers who knowingly hired or em-
ployed them. This was a deliberate legislative choice that grew out of
many years of congressional studies and commissions and the recogni-
tion that Congress could not hope to influence the supply of undocu-
mented workers—the wage discrepancies between the United States and
Mexico were just too great—but it could hope, through regulation, to
dampen employer demand.25 The ‘‘employer sanctions’’ regime thus
obligates employers to check the work authorization status of all new
employees within three days of hire by completing an INS Form I–9,
indicating that the employee is either a U.S. citizen or an immigrant
authorized to work in this country. Employers must retain their com-
pleted I–9s and make them available to immigration agents for inspec-
tion upon request.26 Finally, when Congress enacted IRCA, it recognized
that employers would need time to adjust to the law’s new requirements.
Accordingly, it provided for a slow phase-in, in which the Attorney
General was to issue no fines to employers in the first six months after
IRCA’s enactment nor for a first employer offense committed in a
subsequent grace period of twelve months, or up to June 1, 1988.27
After IRCA made it unlawful to hire undocumented workers, em-
ployers sought to revisit the question whether undocumented workers
were still protected by the NLRA. They renewed the argument that
undocumented workers should not be entitled to backpay because they
could not legally work in the United States and were therefore not
technically ‘‘available’’ for work, the fundamental requirement for back-
pay eligibility. The first wave of post-IRCA cases involved conduct that
occurred before IRCA went into effect. Courts uniformly concluded that
undocumented workers were statutory employees, and moreover, that if
they remained present in the country after a wrongful discharge, they
were eligible for backpay.28 As cases involving post-IRCA conduct began
to reach the courts, the Seventh Circuit concluded undocumented work-
25 See Brief Amici Curiae of ACLU et al., No. 00–1595, 2001 WL 1631648 (discussing
legislative history, including congressional acknowledgment that legislation might influ-
ence employer behavior but could not overcome wage differentials motivating employee
migration).
26 In addition to prohibiting the knowing employment of unauthorized workers, in
1986 Congress adopted provisions barring employers from engaging in discriminatory I–9
practices based on national origin or citizenship status, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b, and later added
provisions barring immigrants from tendering false documents in satisfaction of the I–9
obligation, id. § 1324c.
27 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(iI)(1)(A), (B), (2) (19902000).
28 See Rios v. Enterprise Ass’n Steamfitters Local 638, 860 F.2d 1168, 1172–72 & n. 2
(2d Cir. 1988); see also EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir. 1989) (same
as to backpay under Title VII for pre-IRCA conduct).
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ers were ineligible for backpay, thus raising questions about the continu-
ing viability of the contrary view asserted by the Second and Ninth
Circuits before IRCA went into effect.29
The NLRB attempted to reconcile the divergent court of appeals
opinions. In its lengthy decision in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, it
reaffirmed the view that undocumented immigrants are employees pro-
tected by the NLRA and rejected the argument that immigration status
was a flat bar to backpay. The Board held that undocumented workers
were entitled to the same remedies as other employees so long as the
remedies did not require the employer to violate IRCA.30 Thus, the
employer could be ordered to reinstate employees so long as at the time
of reinstatement the employees could present verification that their
immigration status enabled them to work in the U.S. The Board held
that an employer could be ordered to provide backpay from the date of
discharge until either the date of reinstatement or the date when the
employee failed to produce evidence of eligibility to work in the U.S. In
later cases, the Board made clear that the backpay would be tolled as of
the date the employer learned that the employee was not legally permit-
ted to work in the U.S. It was against this background that Hoffman
Plastic arose.
Factual Background
In May 1988, not long after IRCA went into effect and prior to the
expiration of IRCA’s ‘‘first offense’’ grace period for employers, a man
whose real name may have been Samuel Perez applied for a job under
the name Jose Castro at Hoffman Plastic Compounds factory in Pano-
rama, California.31 He spoke little English and so someone helped him fill
out the six-page application form. On the form, he answered ‘‘Yes’’ to
the question ‘‘Are you prevented from lawfully becoming employed in
29 Compare Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1992) (undocu-
mented workers who remain in the country ineligible for back pay) with Rios v. Enterprise
Ass’n Steamfitters Local 638, 860 F.2d 1168, 1172–72 & n. 2 (2d Cir. 1988) (undocumented
workers eligible for backpay); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir.
1989) (same). In a sui generis Title VII case, the Fourth Circuit adopted the Seventh
Circuit’s approach, arguably deepening the split. See Egbuna v. Time–Life Libraries, Inc.,
153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (per curiam) (temporarily unauthorized worker
refused reinstatement after resignation cannot state claim under Title VII, implying
undocumented workers not covered by Title VII).
30 320 NLRB 408 (1995).
31 Except where indicated otherwise, this account of Castro’s employment at Hoffman
Plastic Compounds and subsequent events is drawn from testimony of Castro, his niece,
and other witnesses at the backpay hearing before the Administrative Law Judge in Los
Angeles on March 4–5, 1993 and June 14, 1993. In the Matter of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. and Casimiro Arauz, Case No. 21–CA–26630, National Labor Relations
Board.
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this country because of visa or immigration status?’’ As part of the
application process, he also completed the I–9 Form establishing that his
immigration status permitted him lawfully to work. In that connection,
Castro presented a birth certificate stating he was born in El Paso,
Texas, a California ID card with his name and photograph, and a Social
Security card in his name. Reflecting on this discrepancy in the file, the
NLRB lawyer who litigated the case suspected that a Hoffman Plastic
office employee looked at the application and explained to Castro that he
could not be hired until he produced a birth certificate, picture ID, and
Social Security card and that Castro went away and came back with the
requested documents.32 Or maybe it was simply that Castro did not
understand the question when the application was translated and filled
out on his behalf. In any event, Castro was hired and went to work at
the factory. While working there he lived in the home of his niece,
sleeping on the living room couch.
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, a family-owned firm, produces a type
of plastic, polyvinylchloride (PVC) pellets, on order for firms that use
PVC to make pharmaceutical, construction, and household products. Its
laboratory employees develop formulae to suit specific customer needs.
The production employees then operate compounding machines that mix
and cook the ingredients according to the formula, and extruding ma-
chines that press the PVC into pellets. Shipping employees bag, store,
and ship the pellets to customers. Jose Castro worked as a production
employee, operating compounding and extruding machines.
Shortly before Christmas 1988, the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
and Plastic Workers of America, AFL–CIO, began to organize the plant.
Dionisio Gonzalez, a union organizer, visited the plant frequently and
gave authorization cards to employees to distribute to co-workers. Castro
was one of the employees who passed out cards. In January 1989, after
supervisors learned of the organizing drive and unlawfully interrogated
employees about their union activity, nine employees were laid off. One
of them was Castro.
One might wonder why Jose Castro, an undocumented minimum-
wage worker who had no home of his own and who had so much to lose,
took the risk of speaking up for the union. According to Peter Tovar, the
NLRB Regional Attorney who handled the case, Castro had been consid-
ered a good, hard-working employee and he was not a leader of the union
organizing drive. He was just in the wrong place at the wrong time.33 To
the extent that he did actively support the union, we can only speculate
about his reasons. Scholars who studied union organizing campaigns in
32 Telephone Interview with NLRB Region 21 Regional Attorney Peter Tovar, January
21, 2004.
33 Telephone Interview with Peter Tovar, January 21, 2004.
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Southern California in the 1980’s and 1990’s found little fear. Some
workers said that if they were deported they would simply come back.
Others said that the possibility of INS raids seemed remote. Some
Mexican and Central American immigrants have some positive experi-
ences of unionism in their home countries and believed that, in contrast
to the death threats leveled against union organizers by right-wing
groups in Central America, in the U.S. the worst thing that could happen
would be that they would lose a low-wage job and be deported home to
family.34 Some undocumented workers vow to reenter the U.S., even as
they are being deported to their home countries, because the conditions
are so dire at home.35
According to Hoffman’s lawyer, Ryan McCortney, the organizing
drive failed and the union withdrew the election petition a few days
before the date of the election. To his knowledge, there have been no
other efforts to unionize the plant, which remains nonunion. Many of
the employees who were fired for union activity were reinstated, al-
though some were later terminated, according to McCortney, for other
reasons.36
Prior Proceedings
One of the laid-off employees, Casimiro Arauz, filed an unfair labor
practice charge. In April 1990, over a year after the layoffs, an ALJ for
the NLRB held a hearing on the complaint. The employees testified that
the supervisors had told employees that the union was ‘‘cabron’’ (which
the ALJ rather delicately described as ‘‘an expression in Spanish which
meant ‘bad’ or ‘something not good’ ’’) and that they ‘‘could get into
trouble if management found out about [their] passing out union cards.’’
Ron Hoffman, the company owner, denied that union activity had
anything to do with the layoffs, insisting instead that they were due to a
decline in orders, and further that employees were selected for layoff
based on a combination of seniority, disciplinary record, and skills. The
ALJ found that the plant hired employees during the time the union
34 Ruth Milkman, Introduction, in Ruth Milkman, ed., Organizing Immigrants at 8–9
(2000). By contrast, for those who have traveled greater distances and at greater cost, such
as undocumented Chinese immigrants who may incur upwards of $50,000 in debt to the
‘‘snakeheads’’ who smuggle them, with family members liable in the event of default, the
consequences of deportation can be far more dire. See Peter Kwong, Forbidden Workers:
Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labor (1997). Similarly, with the increased
militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border since September 11, the prospects of illegal re-
entry following deportation have dimmed, and the possibility of removal has become more
frightening to many Mexican and Central American immigrants.
35 Chris Kraul, Illegal Immigrants Receive a One–Way Ticket to Mexico, L.A.Times
(July 13, 2004).
36 Telephone Interview with Ryan McCortney, January 16, 2004.
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employees had been fired and required existing employees to work
overtime to keep up production. The ALJ found that the evidence was in
conflict about whether Hoffman had laid off employees to rid itself of the
union or for lack of work or some combination of the two. In any event,
however, the ALJ found that Hoffman had selected employees for layoff
based on their union activity because all of the union adherents were
laid off and because supervisors had interrogated them about their
support for the union.37
Both the General Counsel and the employer filed exceptions, which
is the process by which a party appeals an ALJ decision to the Board. In
January 1992, the Board issued a decision that largely upheld the ALJ’s
findings and conclusions, except it found that one of the nine employees
would have been laid off regardless of his union activity.38 Eventually,
the other fired employees settled their charges with Hoffman, and their
immigration status never became an issue.39
In June 1993, an ALJ conducted a compliance hearing to determine
the amount of backpay owed to Castro. Hoffman’s lawyer, Ryan McCort-
ney, was a relatively young lawyer at the time of the compliance hearing.
He had graduated from the University of Southern California Law
School in 1987 and worked in the Los Angeles office of the Sheppard
Mullin law firm since graduation. He claimed later that he had no idea
at the start of the hearing that Castro might be undocumented but hit
upon the possibility entirely by accident based on something Castro
blurted out at the hearing.40 Castro had missed an earlier compliance
hearing and McCortney inquired about his absence. According to
McCortney, Peter Tovar, the Regional Attorney, replied that Castro was
in jail in Texas. Thinking that the jail time would toll the backpay
award, McCortney hired a private investigator to figure out where he
was in jail and how long he had been there. The private investigator
faxed Castro’s birth certificate to the jail. McCortney was surprised when
informed that there was no one by that name in the jail. Suspecting that
the birth certificate was faked, the investigator went to the hospital
where Castro had been born and learned that the certificate was valid.
Rejecting the possibility that Castro was undocumented, McCortney then
asked for a background check on Castro to see whether he had been in
jail at other times that would toll the backpay period. The check revealed
two things: one, that Castro had a trucker’s license, which led McCort-
ney to believe that he easily could have mitigated his lost wages, and
37 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 306 NLRB 100 (1992).
38 Id.
39 Petitioner’s Brief at 3 n.1.
40 Telephone Interview with Ryan McCortney, January 16, 2004.
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two, that he had briefly been in jail in Los Angeles County. Armed with
this information, McCortney went to the compliance hearing intending
to use the information to impeach Castro’s credibility about his mitiga-
tion efforts.
McCortney spent quite a bit of the first part of the hearing trying to
establish where Castro had lived in the four years since his layoff.
McCortney sought to show that Castro had either not been in California,
and thus unavailable for work at the Hoffman plant and ineligible for
backpay, or that he had not made adequate efforts to find work. In
addition, there was some dispute about whether Castro had received a
letter from Hoffman offering him reinstatement (which would also toll
the backpay award). Castro, testifying through a translator, said that he
had been employed at a variety of irregular and low-paying jobs as a
gardener, carpenter’s assistant, and mechanic’s assistant since being
fired from Hoffman and that he had spent six or seven months in El
Paso. McCortney inquired why he had missed earlier compliance hear-
ings. Castro answered that he had missed one because he was in jail for
four days for drinking in public. The hearing recessed briefly for a
sidebar discussion about whether McCortney could inquire further about
the jail time.
McCortney thought Castro’s testimony about his mitigation efforts
was evasive and he began to wonder whether he had the right Jose
Castro. The Los Angeles County jail records contained a description of
Castro which mentioned tattoos on his arms. When the hearing recon-
vened, McCortney asked: ‘‘Mr. Castro, do you have a California driver’s
license?’’ Castro answered no. McCortney later recalled that he suspect-
ed at this point that he had the wrong Jose Castro. McCortney then said,
abruptly, and incomprehensibly if one were relying only on the tran-
script to follow the thread of the action: ‘‘If he rolls up his sleeves on his
arms, that’s the end of it. I mean, if the doesn’t have any tattoos, then
it’s not the person.’’ The ALJ asked Castro whether he had any tattoos
on his arms. Castro did not. ‘‘Okay, that’s not him,’’ said McCortney.
McCortney later recalled that he crumpled up the birth certificate and
threw it in the wastebasket as a dramatic demonstration that this was
the wrong person. The record does not reflect it, and instead simply
indicates that the hearing resumed with more questions about interim
earnings and efforts at mitigation.
Tovar’s theory for why Castro had not worked constantly since
being laid off in 1989 was that Castro had so little education he had
difficulty finding jobs.41 Thus, on cross-examination, Tovar asked how
much education he had received, and Castro replied that he had only two
years of formal education while a young child in Mexico. That made no
41 Telephone Interview with Peter Tovar, January 21, 2004.
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sense to McCortney—why would someone born and raised in Texas have
left school in the second grade? It was not until Castro said he had
attended school in Mexico that it occurred to McCortney that Castro had
borrowed the birth certificate because he was not a legal immigrant. On
redirect, McCortney asked how many years of education he had, and
Castro again said two. McCortney then asked why he had stated on his
employment application that he had eight years of education, and Castro
replied, ‘‘So that I could obtain work.’’ McCortney continued, ‘‘Now, you
were born in El Paso, Texas, correct?’’ ‘‘No, I am Mexican,’’ responded
Castro. ‘‘You’re not a citizen of the United States?’’ ‘‘No.’’ Over the
objection of Tovar, the Regional Attorney, the ALJ permitted McCortney
to ask Castro whether he had documents permitting him to work in the
United States. Castro said he had the birth certificate but admitted that
he had borrowed it from a friend so he could get a job.
A few weeks after the compliance hearing, McCortney wrote the
Regional Director to argue Castro was ineligible for backpay because he
was not authorized to work. Peter Tovar, relying on the Board’s inter-
pretation of Sure–Tan, took the position that backpay was not tolled
unless or until the INS issued a deportation order, so McCortney
threatened to report Castro to the INS unless Tovar stipulated that
Castro was an undocumented alien who had not been legally present in
the United States since before he was hired at Hoffman Plastic. The
Regional Director refused to make such a stipulation, and then sought
guidance from the Division of Advice. In August 1993 the General
Counsel issued an Advice Memorandum concluding that Castro was
indeed entitled to reinstatement and backpay.42
At that time, the case law of the NLRB and the Ninth Circuit held
that undocumented workers could be awarded backpay and reinstate-
ment, although some of the cases predated the enactment of IRCA. Yet
the ALJ rejected this authority and held that Castro was ineligible for
backpay. The ALJ distinguished the Board’s 1992 decision in A.P.R.A
Fuel Oil Buyers Group, which had ordered reinstatement of two undocu-
mented workers, because in that case the employer knew of the employ-
ees’ undocumented status at the time of hire. He distinguished the
Ninth Circuit decision in EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, which awarded
backpay under Title VII to undocumented workers, because their claims
arose prior to IRCA’s effective date.43 And he did not cite the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Local 512 Warehouse and Office Workers’ Union v.
NLRB (Felbro, Inc.), which held that undocumented workers were enti-
tled to backpay under the NLRA, albeit also involving pre-IRCA miscon-
42 Advice Memorandum to Region 21 (Aug. 31, 1993).
43 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir. 1989).
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duct.44 Rather, the ALJ followed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Del
Rey Tortilleria v. NLRB, which held that undocumented workers were
not entitled to backpay after IRCA.45
McCortney was thrilled that the ALJ had rejected the Board position
from A.P.R.A. Fuel which made immigration status irrelevant to a
backpay award.46 He thought it a vindication of his view that it would be
unfair to award backpay to an employee who could not legally have been
hired and could not legally mitigate damages by seeking interim employ-
ment. In his view, making Castro eligible for backpay would result in an
unjust windfall. Peter Tovar, of course, saw the matter differently. In his
view, it is simply unrealistic to think that undocumented immigrants
will sit around rather than mitigate damages. ‘‘They are here to work
and they do work. Castro reported to us every job he had after being
fired from Hoffman, and we discounted the backpay request to reflect all
his interim earnings. There was no unfairness to the employer.’’47
The Regional Director filed exceptions in December 1993. In re-
sponse, McCortney argued to the Board that Castro had misled Hoffman
Plastic by presenting false documents, had misled the NLRB by failing to
testify truthfully at the compliance hearing (having lied about his name),
and could not legally have been hired by Hoffman in the first instance.48
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court McCortney had come to
characterize his client as entirely ‘‘innocent,’’ without knowledge of
Castro’s undocumented status, and thus as an employer who did not
need an NLRA backpay award to deter further hiring of undocumented
workers.49 In the post-hearing brief, however, McCortney did not take
such a strong position. There was no evidence in the record as to
whether Hoffman Plastic had knowingly hired other undocumented
workers, knew of Castro’s immigration status, or had a company policy
against hiring undocumented workers, except the information on the
employment application and the I–9 Form. The most that McCortney
could argue was that the evidence about Castro’s immigration status on
his employment application and I–9 Form conflicted, and that it was
unnecessary to show that Hoffman had a policy against hiring undocu-
44 795 F.2d 705, 722 (9th Cir. 1986).
45 976 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1992).
46 Telephone Interview with Ryan McCortney, January 16, 2004.
47 Telephone Interview with Peter Tovar, January 21, 2004.
48 Answering Brief of Respondent to the Exceptions and Brief of the Counsel for the
General Counsel. Case No. 21–CA–26630 (Jan. 30, 1994).
49 Transcript of Oral Argument, 2002 U.S. Trans Lexis 11 at 14; Petitioner’s Reply
Brief at 12.
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mented workers in order to eliminate its backpay liability because the
law prohibited hiring them.
There followed an unexplained five-year delay in the case. Interest-
ingly, William B. Gould, IV, a Stanford law professor who became Chair
of the NLRB in December 1994, did not recall Hoffman Plastic as being
the ‘‘big case’’ on the issue of the rights of undocumented workers.50
Rather, the big case on that issue was the second decision in A.P.R.A.
Fuel Oil Buyers Group which was issued in December 1995 while the
Hoffman decision was pending.51 In A.P.R.A., four members of the Board
(Gould, Browning, Cohen, and Truesdale) exhaustively considered how
to reconcile the NLRA’s remedial provisions with the IRCA prohibition
on the employment of unauthorized immigrants. The majority of the
Board concluded that the major purpose of IRCA was to deter the
employment of undocumented workers and that providing full NLRA
remedies was consistent with this purpose:
[T]he appeal of undocumented workers to employers is that aliens
will often accept wages and conditions of employment considered
unconscionable in this country. A ready supply of individuals willing
to work for substandard wages in unsafe workplaces, with unregu-
lated hours and no rights of redress, enables the unscrupulous
employers that depend on illegal aliens to turn away Americans and
legally working alien applicants who hesitate to accept the same
conditions. In addition, the continuous threat of replacement with
powerless and desperate undocumented workers would certainly
chill the American and authorized alien workers’ exercise of their
Section 7 rights.52
Thus, the Board concluded in A.P.R.A Fuel that granting NLRA reme-
dies was consistent with, and indeed necessary to, achieve the goals of
IRCA. The Board noted that the employer knew from the time it first
hired the workers that they were undocumented and thus that backpay
was appropriate because they would have remained employed but for
their union activity and the employer’s illegal retaliation for it. The
Board ordered the employer to provide backpay from the dates of
discharge up to the date of reinstatement or the date they failed to
produce evidence required by IRCA of an immigration status authorizing
them to work.53 The Board pointed out in a footnote that an employer
ordinarily would be permitted to cut off backpay liability by proving that
the employees had engaged in conduct that would have led the employer
50 Telephone Interview with William B. Gould, IV, January 21, 2004.
51 320 NLRB 408 (1995).
52 A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 NLRB 408, 414 (1995).
53 Id. at 416.
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to discharge them. Here, though, because the employer knew they were
undocumented at the time of hiring it was precluded from alleging that
it would have terminated them on that basis.54 Two members dissented
in part: Browning because the decision did not do enough to protect the
undocumented workers, and Cohen because it did too much.
By September 1998, when the Board finally issued its decision on
Castro’s entitlement to backpay, Board membership had changed. Co-
hen, Browning, and Truesdale were gone. Fox, Liebman and Hurtgen,
who replaced them, seemed to have a slightly different view of the
equities of remedies for undocumented workers. They followed the
decision in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group and concluded that undocu-
mented workers are entitled to some backpay. But they found a signifi-
cant difference between Hoffman and A.P.R.A., in that in A.P.R.A. the
employer clearly knew the employees were undocumented when it hired
them, and the evidence about whether Hoffman knew Castro was
undocumented was, at most, conflicting. The Board stated:
[T]he record supports the Respondent’s contention that it would not
have offered Castro initial employment had it known of his unautho-
rized immigration status. In this connection, the record shows, and
the judge found, that the Respondent attempted to comply with
IRCA when it hired Castro, and that the Respondent did not learn
until the backpay hearing that Castro used fraudulent identification
in applying for employment.55
The Board noted in a footnote that Castro answered ‘‘yes’’ to the
question on the application whether his immigration status prevented
him from lawfully becoming employed. But the Board rejected the
contention that this showed that Hoffman knew of Castro’s status
‘‘because the record clearly shows that the Respondent only hired Castro
after he had supplied, as the Respondent required, documents that
appeared to be genuine and relate to the person presenting them.’’
Therefore, the Board ordered that Hoffman’s backpay liability terminate
effective June 14, 1993, the date of the hearing at which Castro confess-
ed to being undocumented. The Board thus determined that Castro was
entitled to $66,951 in backpay plus interest for the four and a half years
from when he was fired in January 1989 until the June 1993 compliance
hearing.
There is no reason in the record why the Board took five years to
rule on the case. McCortney said that some well-placed sources told him
that the Board deliberately sat on the case waiting for Board member-
54 Id. at 416 n.44.
55 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 NLRB 1060 (1998).
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ship to change.56 Chairman Gould did not remember any such efforts,
though he did recall members of the Board delaying release of the
decision for some time as they disagreed about how to handle it. He
remembered Hoffman as a somewhat controversial decision, and in fact
drafted an opinion in the case (which was never issued) in which he
disagreed with other members of the Board about whether Hoffman
knew of Castro’s immigration status.57 That unpublished dispute about
Hoffman’s knowledge was the last time the issue was raised; for the rest
of the litigation, McCortney insisted without challenge that his client did
not know Castro was undocumented and would not have hired him if it
had.58
It is unclear whether political controversy was the sole or principal
cause of the delay in issuing the opinion. Nor is it clear what prompted
the Board to reject Chairman Gould’s view that Hoffman was not an
innocent employer whose backpay liability should be terminated. It is
clear, however, that the years the case was pending at the Board were
extremely contentious times, especially after Republicans gained the
majority in the House of Representatives in 1994. Congressional subcom-
mittees conducted unprecedented oversight hearings at which they inter-
rogated Chairman Gould about particular Board decisions and policies
with which they disagreed, and threatened to reduce the Board’s appro-
priations.59 Gould recalled that some Board members or staff feared that
extending statutory rights to undocumented immigrants would be very
controversial.60
McCortney informed company owner Ron Hoffman of the costs and
benefits of petitioning for review of the Board decision. Although advised
that the costs would be high and the chance of winning uncertain,
Hoffman wanted to fight on. When Regional Attorney Tovar insisted
that if Hoffman refused to pay the award the Region would seek
enforcement in the Ninth Circuit, McCortney decided to act. He knew
that the law was not favorable in the Ninth Circuit and that the Act
allows a ‘‘person aggrieved’’ by a board order to seek judicial review in
56 Telephone Interview with Ryan McCortney, January 16, 2004.
57 Telephone Interview with William B. Gould, IV, March 3, 2004.
58 One amicus brief to the Supreme Court opened with a reminder that ‘‘Hoffman does
not contest that one of the illegally laid-off workers had indicated on his employment
application that he was not authorized to work in the United States.’’ Brief Amici Curiae of
Employers and Employer Organizations, at 7. But the reviewing courts were necessarily
bound by the factual finding that Hoffman was unaware of Castro’s status.
59 These events are recounted in detail by Chairman Gould in his book on his tenure at
the Board, William B. Gould, IV, Labored Relations (2000).
60 Telephone Interviews with William B. Gould, IV, January 21, 2004 and March 3,
2004.
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the circuit court of appeals where the dispute arose or in the D.C.
Circuit. He filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit that same day,
in order to beat the NLRB to the courthouse.
McCortney’s guess that the D.C. Circuit would be a hospitable venue
turned out to be wrong. The AFL–CIO filed a forceful amicus brief in
support of the Board and Marsha Berzon, then one of the nation’s
leading labor and employment attorneys and soon to be confirmed by the
Senate as a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
participated in oral argument on behalf of amici. Berzon was a skilled
and experienced appellate advocate, and as one member of the panel
later recalled, she did a superb job presenting the case for enforcement.61
The D.C. Circuit panel, in a majority opinion by Judge David Tatel,
noted a number of points that had been largely overlooked by others.62
The fifteen-page opinion canvassed the history and structure of IRCA
and the various relevant NLRB doctrines on remedies. Judge Tatel
observed that at the time Castro applied for a job, IRCA did not prohibit
using another’s birth certificate or documents to obtain employment.
(IRCA was amended in 1990 to prohibit the use of another’s documents.)
Thus, in the majority’s view, the issue was not a comparative judgment
of Castro’s misconduct in securing the job versus Hoffman’s misconduct
in firing him. Rather, it was whether Castro’s immigration status
rendered him ineligible for backpay. As to that, the majority concluded,
Congress’ intention was plain that there should be ‘‘expanded enforce-
ment of existing labor standards and practices in order to deter the
employment of unauthorized aliens and to remove the economic incen-
tives for employers to exploit and use such aliens.’’63 The majority also
emphasized that IRCA ‘‘does not make it unlawful for an alien to work;
it makes it unlawful for an employer to hire ‘an alien knowing the alien
is TTT unauthorized.’ Having now discovered Castro’s unauthorized
status, Hoffman can no longer employ him lawfully. But at the time
61 Telephone Interview with the Honorable David S. Tatel, June 8, 2004. Berzon’s San
Francisco firm, Altshuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Berzon & Rubin, had particular expertise in
these issues. Another member of the firm, Michael Rubin, had successfully litigated several
of the leading post-Sure–Tan cases, including Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700
(11th Cir. 1988) (undocumented worker is employee for purposes of Fair Labor Standards
Act and may sue for unpaid wages and liquidated damages) and Local 512, Warehouse and
Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB (Felbro), 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986) (wrongfully
discharged undocumented worker who remains in country eligible for backpay). Earlier the
same year Berzon argued Hoffman, the firm had also unsuccessfully petitioned for
certiorari in Egbuna v. Time–Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(per curiam) (temporarily unauthorized worker refused reinstatement after resignation
cannot state claim under Title VII, implying undocumented workers not covered by Title
VII).
62 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
63 Id. at 240 (quoting Pub.L. No. 99–603 § 111(d), 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)).
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Hoffman hired Castro, it complied with IRCA, and from that date until it
learned he is unauthorized, nothing prohibited his continued employ-
ment.’’ The Board’s limitation of the backpay award to the period of
Castro’s lawful availability for employment complied with IRCA and was
consistent with both labor and immigration policy.64
The majority opinion also dealt with the sentence in Sure–Tan
stating that ‘‘in computing backpay, the employees must be deemed
‘unavailable’ for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled)
during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and
employed in the United States.’’ In the majority’s view, that sentence
was dicta, because the Sure–Tan employees were not physically present
in the United States at the time; the sentence was designed to respond to
the Board’s lump-sum award of six months’ backpay for deported work-
ers, which was not tailored to their actual circumstances. Judge Tatel
also read the Sure–Tan sentence in context as indicating approval of the
Seventh Circuit’s having limited its backpay award so as to avoid
creating an incentive for the employees to reenter the country unlawful-
ly to claim backpay.
Judge David Sentelle dissented. In his view, the case was quite
simple. Since Hoffman could not lawfully employ Castro, the company
was immune from ordinary backpay liability for wrongful discharge.
Were it not for the Supreme Court’s decision in Sure–Tan, which
granted undocumented workers statutory rights, Judge Sentelle ‘‘would
hold that by no theory of law or equity could the federal government
compel an employer to employ an illegal alien to do nothing and pay him
for doing nothing when it could not lawfully employ him to work and pay
him for working.’’65 Judge Sentelle’s opinion set forth his view that the
Sure–Tan sentence regarding employees ‘‘deemed ‘unavailable’ for work
TTT during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present
and employed in the United States’’ definitively foreclosed Castro’s
claim.66
McCortney and his client then had another choice to make. A
petition for rehearing en banc would be a long shot—the D.C. Circuit
grants rehearing en banc in only a handful of cases each year. But
McCortney had heard that dissenting Judge Sentelle was a friend and
hunting companion of Justice Antonin Scalia and, thus, was an influen-
tial voice within the court of appeals. So Hoffman gave the go-ahead.67
64 Id. at 243 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (1986)).
65 Id. at 253.
66 Id. at 254 (quoting Sure–Tan, 467 U.S. at 903).
67 Telephone Interview with Ryan McCortney, January 16, 2004.
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The D.C. Circuit agreed to re-hear the case en banc, a strong sign
that a majority of the ten active judges considered the panel decision to
have been wrongly decided.68 James Coppess of the AFL–CIO Office of
General Counsel, an advocate widely respected by the members of the
D.C. Circuit, participated in argument on behalf of the amici.69
To the surprise of prognosticators, the en banc court denied Hoff-
man’s petition for review and enforced the Board’s award, in a 5–4
decision which saw two prominent conservative judges join three of the
court’s more progressive members in the majority.70 The majority opin-
ion, again written by Tatel, largely repeated the analysis of the panel
opinion, and the dissents by Sentelle and Ginsburg largely repeated
Sentelle’s earlier argument that the Sure–Tan footnote controlled.
The Supreme Court Decision
SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS
Hoffman filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court in the
spring of 2001. McCortney thought it was another long shot. His brief
argued that the D.C. Circuit’s decision was in conflict with Sure–Tan
and that the Supreme Court’s intervention was necessary to resolve a
‘‘severe’’ circuit split.71 In opposition, the Board argued that the D.C.
Circuit opinion was fully consistent with Sure–Tan, that no circuit split
existed since the Board’s decision in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group had
addressed the divergent approaches of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,
and that in any event this case was a poor vehicle to resolve any
uncertainties about the best interpretation of Sure–Tan. Foreshadowing
a note of defensiveness that would later reappear in the government’s
brief on the merits, the Board repeatedly stressed that this case, in
which the employer was unaware of Castro’s status at the time of hire,
differed from the knowing employer in A.P.R.A. and most other such
cases, and was therefore ‘‘atypical’’ of the remedial settings in which the
68 2000 WL 985015, 164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2814 (D.C.Cir.2000). Of the ten judges who
voted on the petition for rehearing, only nine took part in the argument and decision.
Judge Silberman assumed senior status between the time of the en banc argument and the
date of the en banc decision, and accordingly participated in the decision, but Judge
Merrick Garland took no part in the argument or decision. 237 F.3d 639, 640 n.* (D.C. Cir.
2001) (en banc).
69 Telephone Interview with the Honorable David S. Tatel, June 8, 2004. Marsha
Berzon had been sworn in as a member of the Ninth Circuit months before the en banc
argument.
70 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
71 The petition for certiorari failed to note the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Egbuna but
did contend a split existed between the Seventh and the D.C., Second, and Ninth Circuits.
Petition for Certiorari, U.S. No. 00–1595, 2001 WL 34091948 (filed Apr. 16, 2001).
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Board had ordered backpay to undocumented immigrants.72 As in Hoff-
man’s petition, the Board’s opposition contained only passing reference
to immigration law other than IRCA.
And then came the attacks of September 11, 2001. McCortney
thought it made all the difference. Although a ‘‘cert memo’’ analyzing
whether the Court should grant the writ of certiorari would have been
produced over the summer by a law clerk in one of the eight chambers
participating in the Justices’ cert pool (which shared the task of analyz-
ing all cases filed), recommending a disposition of the petition, and a
justice would have nominated the petition for discussion well before
September 11, the attacks and their aftermath may have influenced the
Court’s consideration in conference. McCortney recalled that the Court
granted the cert petition two weeks to the day after September 11.
In preparing his brief on the merits and for oral argument, McCort-
ney thought a lot about whether and how to raise the link between lax
immigration enforcement and terrorism. He ultimately decided he did
not need to. One day when he had called the Court to ask a question
about the briefing schedule, the clerk’s office inexplicably did not answer
the phone even though it was during business hours. He learned when
the clerk returned his call the following Monday that the Court had been
evacuated because a letter containing anthrax had been mailed to the
Court. (No evidence was ever made public indicating that an immigrant
was responsible for the anthrax, but the popular perception at the time
was that there may have been a connection to foreign terrorists.) The
clerk explained that he was working out of his van, which was parked on
the street near the Court building. McCortney figured he did not need to
mention the security issues posed by illegal immigration—the justices
had had personal experience with the threat of terrorism. The most
McCortney thought he needed to do at argument was to mention
categories of visas that would allow people to be in the U.S. but not to
work, and thus would render even legal visitors ineligible for backpay.
The example he chose was student visas, because people had told him
that they associated the reference to student visas with the men who
flew the planes into the World Trade Center.73
The NLRB’s brief on the merits also avoided direct reference to the
events of September 11, but it continued in some ways the cautious
approach of the opposition to certiorari. Paul Wolfson, Assistant to the
Solicitor General, who argued the case for the Board in the Supreme
Court, later recalled that the INS had some discomfort with the position
of the Board. He said, however, that the INS accepted the proposition
that border enforcement alone could not stop undocumented immigrants
72 Brief for the NLRB in Opposition, 2001 WL 34090274 (June 16, 2001), at *23.
73 Telephone Interview with Ryan McCortney, January 16, 2004.
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from entering the country in search of work and it endorsed further
efforts to reduce the employment magnet. Unlike review of other agency
actions, however, where the Solicitor General’s office might sometimes
facilitate internal discussions with the challenged agency that could lead
to slightly different agency decisions—and a more legally defensible
position—the Solicitor General’s office must defend the decisions of the
Board as they are issued. The reason is that the NLRB, unlike other
agencies, renders decisions in an adjuducative process that, like a judicial
proceeding, is confidential until the decision is made; there is no oppor-
tunity for involvement of lawyers from the Department of Justice or the
Solicitor General’s Office to craft decisions with likely Supreme Court
litigation in mind. This left Wolfson unsure that Hoffman was winnable.
He was concerned that the Court would treat the case as obviously
controlled by Sure–Tan and dismiss the Board’s opinion as practically
frivolous, resting on a factual distinction of no legal moment—the
continued physical presence of the worker after discharge. In its merits
brief, the Board thus spent nearly the first half of its argument present-
ing a detailed discussion of the Sure–Tan case. Only later did the Board
address the remedial purposes of the NLRA, the goals of IRCA, and the
ways in which the backpay award to Castro was consistent with both.
Mitigation was treated in a paragraph, on the penultimate page of
argument.74
Meanwhile, soon after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, attor-
neys for the AFL–CIO, civil rights groups, and others began working to
coordinate the preparation of amicus briefs. It was quickly agreed that
the AFL–CIO and its outside counsel would approach the case from a
labor law perspective, including a close analysis of the Sure–Tan case
and an emphasis on the tradition of deference to the Board’s broad
remedial authority. The ACLU would analyze the case from an immigra-
tion law perspective, including an exhaustive examination of the legisla-
tive origins of IRCA, to argue that Congress did not intend IRCA to alter
the outcome in Sure–Tan, nor to limit labor law remedies. The ACLU
would argue that IRCA made only more evident Congress’ intent that
undocumented workers be eligible for backpay. Several civil rights advo-
cacy organizations would organize a ‘‘Brandeis brief’’ collecting stories of
exploitation of immigrants in the workplace. Finally, the attorneys
74 Brief for the NLRB, No. 00–1595; Telephone Interview with Paul R.Q. Wolfson,
March 1, 2004; Telephone Interview with Bo Cooper, INS General Counsel in 2001–03,
July 23, 2004. Notably, neither the Board nor Hoffman nor any of the amici engaged Board
precedent addressing the appropriate remedy for wrongful discharge where there is a legal
impediment to reinstatement other than immigration status, such as wrongful discharge of
underage workers or unlicensed drivers, neither of whom can be re-employed lawfully. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Future Ambulette, Inc., 903 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1990) (crafting remedy of
backpay and conditional reinstatement for wrongfully discharged driver with suspended
license).
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agreed that two less common briefs would be useful, one by state
attorneys general emphasizing that, whatever the outcome in Hoffman,
state labor, employment, workers’ compensation, tort, contract, and
insurance law must be left undisturbed. Last, if possible, would be a
brief on behalf of mainstream employers frustrated by unfair competi-
tion from outlaw shops that violated labor and immigration laws. All five
briefs, including the states’75 and employer association briefs,76 were
eventually filed.
Tellingly, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce declined to file a brief on
either side, which supporters of the Board considered a victory.77 If
McCortney was dismayed by the fact that employer organizations either
came in on the other side or stayed out of the case entirely, he did not
admit it. He dismissed as ‘‘nonsense’’ the argument that giving backpay
would give unethical employers a competitive advantage. When told that
his position gained no support from employer or business organizations,
Ron Hoffman just said ‘‘basically, to hell with them.’’78 Nor, despite the
75 The state attorneys general amicus was drafted by labor attorneys in the office of
Elliott Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, see 2001 WL 1636790, and other states were
recruited to sign on. The New York Attorney General’s Office recognized that a substantial
number of their labor cases involved immigrant workers, and that an adverse Supreme
Court ruling might threaten to undermine not only state labor law regimes but unemploy-
ment insurance, workers’ compensation, tort, and other laws as well. The eventual
signatories to the amicus included the Attorneys General from three of the states with the
highest population of undocumented immigrants (California, New York, and Arizona).
Despite last-minute efforts in the week before briefs were due, supported by attorneys
working through state labor federations, bar associations, and personal contacts, failed to
persuade the Attorneys General of Florida, Illinois, and Texas declined to sign on.
Telephone Interview with M. Patricia Smith, Assistant Attorney General in Charge of
Labor Bureau, Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, July 21, 2004.
[authority?]
76 While notable for their endorsement of a Board decision favoring an employee, the
employer associations applied a traditional economic analysis in arguing that a rule
exempting employers of undocumented immigrants from ordinary backpay liability for
wrongful discharge was ‘‘bad for business’’ and would allow outlaw shops to compete
unfairly with mainstream businesses that honored labor and immigration laws. 2001 WL
1631729. One author of this chapter, Michael Wishnie, was counsel of record for the
employer association amicus.
77 Although the September 11 attacks temporarily derailed broad-ranging U.S.-Mexico
talks that had been underway all that year, important employer sectors such as the hotel
industry and agribusiness continued to hope for an expanded guestworker program and
other legislation to increase the number of available immigrant workers. The employers,
sensitive to criticism that guestworker programs had historically sanctioned widespread
labor exploitation, may not have wished to be seen endorsing an employer’s efforts to avoid
sanction for the retaliatory discharge of an immigrant involved in a union organizing
campaign.[authority?]
78 Telephone Interview with Ryan McCortney, January 16, 2004.
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immigration law features of the case, did any representative of the
immigration bar file briefs.
As oral argument approached, observers considered Justice Kennedy
the likely decisive vote. Chief Justice Rehnquist had dissented from the
Sure–Tan holding that undocumented workers were even statutory
‘‘employees’’ under the NLRA, and together with Justices Scalia and
Thomas seemed certain to reject the analysis of the Board and D.C.
Circuit. Justice O’Connor, as the author of Sure–Tan, was assumed to be
hostile to backpay for immigrants and might perceive the Board’s
decision as an unprincipled effort to limit Sure–Tan to its facts. On the
other side, Justice Stevens had dissented in Sure–Tan, and Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer had displayed both a willingness to defer
to reasonable Board decisions and a sensitivity for immigrants and
working people. That left Justice Kennedy who, while a member of the
Ninth Circuit, had joined an opinion holding that the NLRA applied to
undocumented immigrants, penning a short concurrence that declared,
‘‘If the NLRA were inapplicable to workers who are illegal aliens, we
would leave helpless the very persons who most need protection from
exploitative employer practicesTTTT’’79 Although considered generally
conservative, Kennedy had at times cast important votes in favor of civil
rights and immigrant rights, and he had also supplied a fifth vote to
affirm the Board in at least one case in which the Justices might have
come out differently were they judging the matter in the first instance.80
Labor and immigration advocates hoped Kennedy’s sympathy for the
situation of exploited immigrant workers might combine with an under-
standing of the concerns of law-abiding small businesses about unfair
competition to yield a fifth vote.
It was Ryan McCortney’s first Supreme Court argument. He had
been involved in the case since he was a junior associate, and by the time
he stood before the Justices he was a partner. A more senior lawyer had
argued both times in the D.C. Circuit, but Ryan had told him, at a time
when it was just talk, that if the case went to the Supreme Court, he
wanted to argue it. So McCortney got his chance. It was a big day in his
life—he said everyone expects to be really nervous, but that the morning
of the argument he woke ‘‘as calm as I’ve ever been in my life.’’
McCortney invited Wendy Delmendo, a former Sheppard Mullin associ-
ate who, while a stay-at-home mother, had drafted the briefs for McCort-
79 NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
80 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating anti-gay state initiative); INS
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (interpreting immigration statutes as preserving judicial
review of certain removal decisions and not applying retroactively); Holly Farms Corp. v.
NLRB, 517 U.S. 392 (1996) (upholding as reasonable Board determination that chicken
catchers are NLRA ‘‘employees,’’ not exempt agricultural workers).
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ney, to come to the argument. Going into the argument, McCortney
believed the key votes were those of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.
As counsel for petitioner, McCortney spoke first. When, at the
beginning of the argument, Kennedy asked him a friendly question—
‘‘And is it correct that when Sure–Tan was argued, IRCA TTT was being
considered by Congress and the Government in its argument told us that
if IRCA had been passed, back pay would not be available?’’—McCortney
figured he had Kennedy and needed only O’Connor’s vote to win.81
McCortney’s theory was that he had to distinguish his client—who did
not know he had hired an undocumented worker—from employers who
did know. He had decided to label his client as the ‘‘innocent employer’’
to distinguish him from ‘‘the unscrupulous employer.’’ The problem was
that the NLRB’s rule, which terminated backpay liability on the date the
employer learned the employee was undocumented, might actually treat
the employer who knew it hired undocumented workers more favorably
than one who did not. As one justice remarked, ‘‘It seems to me that’s
absolutely upside down.’’ McCortney was forced to admit, ‘‘that’s the
problem with the rule, is that it in some ways rewards the unscrupulous
employer in Sure–Tan and penalizes the innocent employer, as in
Hoffman.’’ He continued, ‘‘If the unscrupulous employer knowingly hires
an illegal alien, then whenever some kind of union organizing drive
comes along and say gee, we can get rid of them, and we know they’re
illegal, and we’re going to terminate them, then they can report them to
the INS right from the outset TTT get him deported, and cut off back
pay.’’ That prompted the following interchange:
JUSTICE BREYER: Take an employer who, you know, all he does,
he says, I’ve checked their cards, I’ve checked their cards, the cards
say they’re here legally, and he runs some God-awful sweat shop.
Now, your theory, there is no remedy under any law against that
employer but for a prospective remedy, and so everyone gets one bite
at that apple.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, he has to pay for the sweat, though,
doesn’t he?
MR. McCORTNEY: Absolutely.
JUSTICE BREYER: And it’s pretty low cost, because he’s violating
every labor law under the sun.
Wolfson approached the oral argument with different concerns. A
skillful and experienced Supreme Court advocate, Wolfson had clerked
for Justice Byron White in 1989–90 and spent nearly the entire Clinton
Administration in the Solicitor General’s Office, handling a number of
ERISA, labor, and employment law matters. But Wolfson was apprehen-
81 The transcript of oral argument is available at 2002 WL 77224.
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sive that the Court would ‘‘tear my head off in this case,’’ because the
justices might conclude that the Board had impermissibly ignored Sure–
Tan. The key vote of Justice Kennedy seemed to Wolfson ‘‘almost
impossible’’ to secure. Wolfson also recognized that a hostile opinion
reversing the D.C. Circuit could sweep more broadly than necessary,
endangering cases involving knowing employers, state law regimes, and
perhaps the Board’s remedial authority generally. Wolfson also knew
that when his colleague Edwin Kneedler had argued Sure–Tan before
the Supreme Court, Kneedler had seemed to concede that, were Con-
gress to prohibit the employment of undocumented workers, those
workers would become ineligible for backpay (Wolfson later did not recall
any discussion in the Solicitor General’s Office of the possibility that
Kneedler, who had argued many recent immigration cases before the
Court, would take on Hoffman).82
Despite these concerns, there were some signs during McCortney’s
argument that not all was lost for Castro and the Board. Justices Scalia
and Kennedy had both commented that the Court’s Sure–Tan opinion
did not decide the issues in Hoffman— remarks that signaled a majority
of the Court might agree with the D.C. Circuit and Board on this crucial
threshold point. Yet Wolfson was challenged the moment he rose to
speak, unable even to complete the traditional opening, ‘‘May it please
the Court,’’ before Justice Scalia interrupted. ‘‘What was the position of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service— TTT in this matter when it
was told that it—that you’re going to argue that courts should pay illegal
aliens money that it was unlawful for them to earn? What did the INS
say to that?’’ Wolfson replied, ‘‘The INS has agreed with it and accepts it
TTT’’ Scalia retorted, ‘‘well, I have no—it explains why we have a massive
problem of illegal immigration, if that’s how the INS feels about this.’’83
Scalia then pushed Wolfson on whether undocumented immigrants
should ever be eligible for backpay because they are unable lawfully to
mitigate: ‘‘If he’s smart he’d say, how can I mitigate, it’s unlawful for
me to get another jobTTTT I can just sit home and eat chocolates and get
my back pay.’’
82 Sure–Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, Transcript of Oral Argument, 1983 Trans Lexis 5 at 47–48
(government statement that if Congress barred employment of undocumented immigrants,
the ‘‘employment relationship would then become illegal, and for the Board to order the
reinstatement of the employee to an illegal relationship and to pay him inconsistent with
such a statute would clearly be improper’’); Telephone Interview with Paul R.Q. Wolfson,
March 1, 2004.
83 Wolfson recalled that Solicitor General Theodore Olson was upset by Scalia’s
question, because the Solicitor’s office represents both the INS and the NLRB. Wolfson
himself thought the inquiry an improper intrusion into the internal deliberations of the
Executive Branch. Telephone Interview with Paul R.Q. Wolfson, March 1, 2004.
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More devastating than Scalia’s barbs, however, was the moment
mid-way through Wolfson’s argument when Justice Kennedy leaned
forward to ask if it would be lawful if a union ‘‘knowingly uses an alien
for organizing activity.’’ Wolfson answered that under Sure–Tan and
Board precedent, undocumented immigrants are included in a bargain-
ing unit, but Kennedy pressed the unexpected, and unmistakably hostile,
point. ‘‘And that doesn’t induce illegal immigration? TTT Here what
you’re saying is that a union can, I suppose even knowingly, use illegal
aliens on the workforce to organize the employer TTT That seems to me
completely missing from TTT any equitable calculus in your brief. I’m
quite puzzled by it.’’ Kennedy’s aversion to the very idea of undocu-
mented immigrants participating in a union was an ominous portent and
strongly suggested that the Board would lose.
McCortney had expected his ‘‘innocent employer’’ strategy to be
successful, but only in the middle of the government’s presentation,
during Justice Kennedy’s and then Justice O’Connor’s questioning of
Wolfson, did he feel it had truly delivered the case. Justice O’Connor
asked Wolfson, ‘‘What [the Board’s rule is] doing, though, really is kind
of odd, because the result is that back pay awards to illegal workers are
likely to be greater than to legal ones under this Board’s policy, and
that’s so odd, and it gives the illegal alien an incentive to try to phony up
more documents and to extend for the longest possible time the charade
that the worker is here lawfully, and that’s surely strongly against the
policies of the immigration act at the very least.’’ At this question,
McCortney suspected he had the fifth vote he needed.
Overall, Wolfson had wanted to present the case as a labor case in
which deference to the Board was appropriate, but much of the argu-
ment treated it as an immigration case arising under IRCA. ‘‘I could
hear the INS attorneys shifting nervously behind me,’’ Wolfson remem-
bers, during questioning about the Board’s authority and expertise in
considering IRCA when fashioning a remedial order. The justices’ focus
on IRCA also served to highlight Castro’s wrongdoing in tendering false
documents; had the argument centered more on the NLRA, Wolfson
would have had more opportunities to discuss Hoffman’s own miscon-
duct in discharging Castro for his union activities. In a final reminder
that behind the Court’s theoretical discussion of national immigration
and labor policies exist the lives and experiences of real people, the day
after argument Wolfson received a call from the Office of the President
of Mexico, offering to assist in locating the man still referred to as Jose
Castro.
Many observers of the litigation had predicted before argument that
Hoffman would prevail, and the oral presentations seemed to confirm
their prescience. Accordingly, the very afternoon of the argument, a
small group of labor and immigration advocates met with staff to the
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Senate Labor Committee and Senate Immigration Subcommittee to
begin developing a legislative strategy in the event the Court overturned
the Board’s order.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, 5–4. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices
Scalia, Thomas, O’Connor, and Kennedy. Justice Breyer dissented,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.84 This was the same
line-up that had decided many other politically controversial decisions of
the Rehnquist Court, including civil rights, voting rights, and federalism
issues and the election-determining Bush v. Gore.85
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion began by analogizing employees
who worked without immigration authorization to employees who are
ineligible for reinstatement or backpay because they have ‘‘committed
serious criminal acts’’such as trespass or violence against the employer’s
property. The Court then noted that in Sure–Tan it had held that the
Board lacked authority to order reinstatement to employees who had
departed to Mexico, even though the employer had violated §§ 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) by reporting the employees to the INS in retaliation for
union activity. Next, the Court distinguished its prior decision in ABF
Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, which had held that the Board was not
obligated to deny backpay to an employee who gave false testimony in a
compliance proceeding.86 The Court said that perjury, ‘‘though serious,
was not at all analogous to misconduct that renders an underlying
employment relationship illegal.’’
Then the Court came to the heart of its reasoning—whether a
backpay award would undermine ‘‘a federal statute or policy outside the
Board’s competence to administer,’’ namely, the immigration laws. The
Court explained that IRCA prohibits employers from hiring undocu-
mented workers, and obligates employers to discharge them upon dis-
covery of the undocumented status. The Court also noted that the Im-
migration and Nationality Act prohibits non-citizens from using false
documents. Repeatedly characterizing Castro’s behavior as ‘‘criminal’’—
despite Castro’s acknowledgment on his initial employment application
that he was unauthorized to work in the United States and the absence
of any criminal charge or conviction—the Court went on to explain that
awarding backpay ‘‘condones and encourages future violations’’ of immi-
gration law because the eligibility for backpay turns both on remaining
84 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
85 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
86 510 U.S. 317 (1994).
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(presumably illegally) in the United States and mitigating damages by
finding other work (also presumably illegally). Hoffman’s own illegal
conduct in firing Castro for his union activities was almost absent from
the majority opinion. To the question whether denial of backpay would
encourage or reward employers who hire unauthorized workers by
allowing them to violate labor law with impunity, Rehnquist responded
curtly that the cease and desist order and notice posting requirement
are ‘‘sufficient to effectuate national labor policy.’’ The majority ex-
pressly declined to decide whether awarding backpay to Castro would be
impermissibly punitive, inasmuch as undocumented workers ‘‘have no
entitlement to work in the United States at all,’’ and, therefore, argu-
ably might not be entitled to be paid anything. Notably, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion did not attempt to reargue that undocumented
workers are not statutory ‘‘employees’’ under the NLRA, the point on
which he and Justice Powell had dissented in Sure–Tan.
In dissent, Justice Breyer began by noting that all agencies of the
United States responsible for enforcing immigration and labor policy had
concluded that backpay was consistent with immigration policy and,
indeed, ‘‘helps to deter unlawful activity that both labor laws and
immigration laws seek to prevent.’’ Justice Breyer continued: ‘‘Without
the possibility of the deterrence that backpay provides,’’ employers
might conclude that they could violate the labor laws with impunity.
Next, examining the text and history of the INA, Breyer noted that
IRCA does not state how violation of its provisions should affect enforce-
ment of other laws, but that the policy underlying IRCA—‘‘to diminish
the attractive force of employment, which like a ‘magnet’ pulls illegal
immigrants toward the United States’’—is undermined by denial of
backpay, which reduces the cost of labor law violations for employers and
thus ‘‘increases the employer’s incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien
employees.’’
Justice Breyer also challenged the majority’s analogy to cases in
which backpay was denied because of an employee’s serious criminal
acts. In those cases, Breyer observed, reinstatement and backpay were
denied because the employee responded to the employer’s anti-union
conduct with illegal conduct, and it was the employee’s illegal conduct
that both prompted and justified the employer in firing the employee.
Here, in contrast, the employer’s anti-union conduct was the firing, and
it was neither motivated by nor justified by the employee’s own conduct.
After all, according to the uncontested factual finding, Hoffman had no
idea that Castro was undocumented. Finally, Justice Breyer dismissed
the majority’s objection that a backpay award would represent ‘‘unlaw-
fully earned wages’’ that could be obtained only through ‘‘criminal
fraud.’’ The same award ‘‘requires an employer who has violated the
labor laws to make a meaningful monetary payment’’ for work that the
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employer believed the employee could lawfully have earned for work that
he would have performed absent the employer’s illegal conduct.
Ultimately, the Court confronted a choice. It could wholly exempt a
law-breaking employer from all monetary sanction, as Hoffman urged,
because the illegally discharged employee happened also to be an unau-
thorized immigrant. Or the Court could defer to the Board’s conclusion
and enforce a compromise remedy that awarded Castro less than the
traditional make-whole relief of full backpay and reinstatement, but
more than nothing. At a broader level, the Court faced a choice between
reading the labor and immigration laws as contradictory or, as the
legislative history of IRCA seemed to indicate, as part of a comprehen-
sive congressional scheme to protect wage levels in the U.S. while
diminishing the incentive for outlaw employers to prefer unauthorized
immigrants to legal workers. In the majority opinion’s only reference to
the legislative history of IRCA, a footnote, the opinion dismissed the
legislative history as ‘‘a single Committee Report from one House of a
politically divided Congress, which is a rather slender reed’’ on which to
rely. The majority went on to assert that the legislative history showed
only that Congress endorsed the Sure–Tan holding that undocumented
aliens are employees, and said nothing about the Board’s authority to
award backpay. The majority rejected the possibility that, because Castro
had in fact sought and obtained work after Hoffman illegally fired him,
the precise operation of the duty to mitigate could be postponed to a
future case. Instead, the majority chose a different path, convinced that
the NLRA’s compensatory and deterrence goals were either fully accom-
plished through a cease-and-desist order, or could not be reconciled with
IRCA, or, more likely, that the NLRA’s purposes were simply less
important than those of the immigration law’s document fraud provi-
sions.
The Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Hoffman in March
2002, only two months after the argument. The rapid ruling caught
advocates for both sides by surprise. McCortney and his client were
delighted; labor and immigrant defense advocates were quick to con-
demn the decision and vowed to seek a legislative fix. McCortney heard
about it on the radio on his way into work and by the time he spoke to
his client, Ron Hoffman said: ‘‘There are five TV camera trucks in my
parking lot. What should I do?’’ Hoffman insisted the case was less a
matter of principle than of money. Indeed, he ultimately paid as much in
legal fees ($45,000) as he would have paid in back wages had he simply
followed the Board’s initial order to offer reinstatement to Jose Castro.87
By March 2002, if the backpay award going back to 1989 were upheld,
the accumulated pay plus interest would have been a considerable sum.
87 Steve Toloken, Supreme Court Hears Hoffman, Plastics News 3 (Jan. 21, 2002)
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Hoffman had told the press after the case was argued that it was unfair
that he should be forced to pay backpay to any worker whom he fired,
regardless of immigration status. ‘‘I don’t think it’s right to pay backpay
for anyone who doesn’t earn it—whether they are here legally or
illegally.’’88 Both he and McCortney were upset that the long delays in
the appellate process (the Supreme Court decided the case thirteen years
after Castro had been fired) meant that the accumulated interest on the
backpay award was substantial, and that the number of years for which
Castro might have been eligible for backpay vastly exceeded the number
of months that Castro had worked for Hoffman.
To organizers and workers watching the case, the thirteen-year
delay sent an equally troubling message. A wait of more than a decade
from termination to final adjudication, even if backpay relief were
available, is enough to dissuade many workers from bothering to pursue
relief from the Board. Union organizers working in Los Angeles today
agree. Lawyers organizing the predominantly Latino, and heavily undoc-
umented, low-wage workforce in Southern California believe that the
NLRB will do nothing to help protect workers who seek to join unions.
They long ago concluded that the Board’s processes are worse than
useless for winning representation, and recognize that organizing cam-
paigns are won based solely on the union’s support among workers and
the community, not based on legal protections for union elections. They
regard Hoffman Plastic as just another nail in the coffin of labor law. As
one SEIU organizer said, ‘‘the law was bad before, but it’s ridiculous
now. But the strength of the union doesn’t come from the lawTTTT It
comes from the power of the members.’’89 An SEIU lawyer did not think
that undocumented workers were deterred from joining a union by weak
NLRA protections.90
Wolfson was naturally disappointed by the result but also relieved
that the Court had found the case relatively difficult and had split 5–4.
He was also consoled that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion had not
been disdainful of the Board. From the perspective of the Solicitor
General’s Office, which represents the Board before the Court every
Term, preserving the justices’ respect for the NLRB is an important
goal. Hoffman Plastic was an important case, but it was only one of
many the Board must defend before the Court. Wolfson felt he had
88 Thomas Maier, Pitting Labor Against INS Laws, Newsday (Feb. 19, 2002).
89 Interview with SEIU organizer Leticia Salcedo, September 24, 2003. On the atti-
tudes of Los Angeles union organizers toward the challenges of organizing immigrant
workers, see Ruth Milkman, ed., Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in
Contemporary California (2000).
90 Interview with Monica Guizar, lawyer representing SEIU Local 1877 in Los Angeles,
September 26, 2003.
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protected the Board’s institutional reputation and its claim to deference
in future cases.
Whatever the case meant to others, it seemed to have done little for
Jose Castro. At the time of the compliance hearing in June 1993, Castro
was living and working in Texas. By the time of the Supreme Court
argument, according to an NLRB spokesperson, he was living in Mexi-
co.91 The case did trouble Dionisio Gonzalez, the organizer who first tried
to help the Hoffman employees. When interviewed about the decision in
April 2002, he was working as an organizer for the United Steelworkers.
He said: ‘‘It makes it real difficult to convince someone to sign a union
cardTTTT At Hoffman I told them they were protected under the law. I
guess I was wrong.’’92
The Immediate Impact and Continuing
Importance of Hoffman Plastic
Not surprisingly, the initial reaction to the decision by labor and
immigrant rights advocates was extremely critical. Reflecting the lack of
a uniform employer view on the case while it was being litigated,
employer responses to the decision were mixed.93 One scholar labeled
Hoffman as a revival of the infamous Bracero Program, a discredited
form of guestworker program that brought 4.6 million Mexicans to the
United States for agricultural work between 1946 and 1962 but did so
under circumstances that ensured they worked for low wages in poor
conditions.94 Others expressed dismay that the decision had encouraged
employers to violate labor laws with impunity.95 While some of these
concerns may be overstated, some employers did seek to take immediate
advantage. In New York, a lawyer for an employer who had violated
minimum wage laws threatened a group of protesters outside his client’s
store, citing Hoffman and claiming the Supreme Court had ruled ‘‘illegal
91 Steve Toloken, Supreme Court Hears Hoffman, Plastics News 3 (Jan. 21, 2002).
92 Nancy Cleeland, Employers Test Ruling on Immigrants Labor; Some Firms are
Trying to Use Supreme Court Decision as Basis for Avoiding Claims Over Workplace
Violations, L.A. Times (Apr. 22, 2002) at C1.
93 See, e.g., Scott Hauge, Letter, Court hurts those who play by rules, S.F. Chronicle
(Apr. 4, 2002) (‘‘small business community is outraged’’ by Hoffman decision, which is
‘‘slap in the face to employers that play by the rules’’ and unfair ‘‘to the employer who is
trying to play it straight’’).
94 Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor
Policy, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 2–4 (2003).
95 Rebecca Smith & Maria Blanco, Used and Abused: The Treatment of Undocumented
Victims of Labor Law Violations Since Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 8 Bender’s
Immigration Bulletin 890 (May 15, 2003).
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immigrants do not have the same rights as U.S. citizens.’’96 Immigrants,
perhaps cowed by the reduced protection against retaliation, reported
fewer labor violations to the New York Attorney General’s Office after
the Court’s decision.97
The Hoffman decision had a number of immediate legal effects. At
the Supreme Court, the lawyers and the justices seemed concerned about
the implications of the ruling for remedies under labor and employment
laws other than the NLRA. McCortney had argued that a ruling for
Hoffman would affect only backpay for work not performed. Thus, he
attempted to draw a line between laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act
that require payment of wages for work performed—to which undocu-
mented immigrants would be entitled—and laws like the NLRA and
Title VII that provide prospective remedies, such as backpay, for work
not performed. Wolfson pointed out in his argument that most states
have held that undocumented workers are entitled to workers’ compen-
sation benefits even though the benefits compensate in part for wages
that were not earned.
The first wave of legal developments after Hoffman occurred in
executive branch agencies and concerned just this question of remedies.
Within months, federal and state agencies began to rescind old regulato-
ry materials and issue new guidance. In general, federal agencies as-
sumed Hoffman barred backpay and reinstatement under other federal
laws, but did not preclude other statutory remedies. The EEOC promptly
rescinded its prior directive that undocumented workers are eligible for
backpay under Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes,
but reaffirmed that undocumented immigrants are statutory ‘‘employ-
ees’’ and remain eligible for compensatory and punitive damages.98 The
U.S. Department of Labor acted similarly, declaring that undocumented
workers were still covered ‘‘employees’’ under the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act,
and that such workers remained eligible for minimum wage or overtime
compensation for work already performed.99 And the Board itself, in its
first post-Hoffman decision to touch on these issues, agreed that undocu-
mented workers were eligible for damages for work already performed,
96 Ironically, the attorney for the workers, Ben Sachs, had been the principal author of
the ACLU’s amicus brief in Hoffman Plastic, and he was well-positioned to advise his
clients on the actual holding of the case.
97 Telephone interview with M. Patricia Smith, July 21, 2004.
98 Nancy Montwieler, EEOC: EEOC Limits Undocumented Workers’ Relief Based on
Recent Supreme Court Decision, 126 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A–2 (July 1, 2002).
99 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #48, Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Immigrant
Workers: Effect of Hoffman Plastics decision on laws enforced by the Wage and Hour
Division (Aug. 19, 2002).
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where the employer unlawfully reduced employee wages in retaliation for
protected activity.100
Only one agency explicitly grappled with the case of the ‘‘knowing’’
employer, a distinction that had been crucial to McCortney in crafting
his arguments and a case that Justice Breyer in dissent had maintained
was not before the Court. Unfortunately for workers, in July 2002 the
NLRB General Counsel rejected the arguments of the AFL–CIO and
others and concluded that all employers, innocent or knowing, were
exempt from backpay liability for the wrongful discharge of undocu-
mented workers.101 The General Counsel sets enforcement policy for the
NLRB, and thus his determination that employers who deliberately hire
undocumented workers are exempt from backpay liability was a blow for
those in the NLRB’s regional offices and in the labor movement who had
hoped that the NLRB would take a more limited view of Hoffman.
Some state agencies, including in California and Washington, took a
different view, however, concluding that nothing in Hoffman preempted
state laws allowing even backpay, the very remedy at issue in Hoffman,
to undocumented workers. The Attorney General of New York went no
further than the U.S. Department of Labor, agreeing that undocumented
workers remained eligible for minimum wage and overtime damages for
work already performed, but declining to express a view on backpay,
punitive damages, or other state law remedies.102
The implications of Hoffman have only just begun to be tested in
litigation. To date, every federal court to consider the issue has endorsed
the view, shared by all agencies, that immigration status is no bar to
recovery of damages for work already performed.103 As to other remedies,
workers have succeeded in the earliest cases in pressing points rejected
100 Tuv Taam Corp., 340 NLRB No. 86, at 4 & n. 4, 2003 WL 22295361 (2003).
101 Memorandum GC 02–06, Procedures and Remedies for Discriminatees Who May be
Undocumented Aliens after Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. (July 19, 2002), available at
¢www.nlrb.gov/gcmemo/gc02–06.html$.
102 See Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, All California Workers Are Entitled to Workplace
Protection (after Hoffman decision, announcing labor agency will seek backpay ‘‘without
regard to the worker’s immigration status’’); Statement of Gary Moore, Wash. State Dep’t of
Labor and Indus. (May 21, 2002) (stating that Hoffman will not affect availability of
remedies under Washington state labor laws); 2003 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. No. F3 (Hoffman
does not bar undocumented worker recovery under state wage and hour law for work
already performed).
103 See, e.g., Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(immigration status irrelevant to FLSA claims for time actually worked); Topo v. Dhir, 210
F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.Supp.2d 462, 463–65
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. CV0100515AHM(SHX), 2002 WL
1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal.2002) (same); Cortez v. Medina’s Landscaping, Inc., No. 00 C
6320, 2002 WL 31175471 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002) (same); see also Martinez v. Mecca
Farms, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 601, 604–05 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (explaining that, under AWPA, farm
T
T
T
T
FNS
FNS
FNS
FNS
05035099w01wLT05.COOPER.TXT.RVwINITIALwFPCOOPw2/4w9:24wRev. 7.1 (TOS)
Job Name COOPERTXwJob# 47364wReg# 0-2930-7wPg Ranges (1,399)wPg# 387
387CATHERINE L. FISK & MICHAEL J. WISHNIE
by the federal agencies. For instance, the only court since Hoffman to
publish an opinion in a case involving a ‘‘knowing’’ employer determined
that a ‘‘knowing’’ employer was not immune from post-discharge liabili-
ty.104 And the first federal court of appeals to examine a post-Hoffman
question rejected the EEOC’s assumption that Hoffman even applies in
Title VII actions. It said: ‘‘the overriding national policy against discrim-
ination would seem likely to outweigh any bar against the payment of
back wages to unlawful immigrants in Title VII cases. Thus, we seriously
doubt that Hoffman applies in such actions.’’105 State courts have also
generally held since Hoffman that the decision does not preclude undocu-
mented immigrants from recovering for lost wages under tort law106 or in
workers’ compensation cases.107
Courts have also generally barred discovery of immigration status in
labor and employment litigation, concluding that compelled disclosure of
a worker’s status is irrelevant where remedies are available regardless of
status and would have an obvious in terrorem effect on the willingness of
immigrant workers to vindicate labor rights.108 The NLRB too has
workers eligible for compensation for work already performed, regardless of immigration
status, even after Hoffman).
104 Singh v. Jutla, 214 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The Singh opinion was
authored by Judge Charles Breyer, brother of Justice Stephen Breyer.
105 Rivera v. Nibco, 364 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004).
106 See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 242–44 (Tex. App. 2003)
(undocumented worker may seek damages for lost wages in negligence action for injuries
suffered in forklift collision); Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. Richmond
Co. 2003) (same, for injuries caused by electric meter explosion during course of employ-
ment); see also Madeira v. Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc., 315 F.Supp.2d 504, 506–07
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same, for injured construction worker seeking damages under state law).
107 Rajeh v. Steel City Corp., 2004 Ohio 3211, 2004 WL 1379829 (Ohio App. 7 Dist.
June 15, 2004) (undocumented immigrant under order of deportation eligible for Ohio
workers’ compensation benefits); Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324 (Minn.
2003) (undocumented worker eligible for benefits under Minnesota workers’ compensation
law); Safeharbor Employer Services I, Inc. v. Velazquez, 860 So.2d 984 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003)
(same); Cherokee Industries, Inc. v. Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798, 801 (Ok. Civ. App. 2003) (same);
Wet Walls, Inc. v. Ledezma, 598 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. App. 2004) (same); see also Medellin v.
Cashman, 2003 WL 231001186 (Mass. Dept. Ind. Acc. Dec. 23, 2003) (same). But see
Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Astudillo), 810 A.2d 99, 108–09 & n.12
(Pa. 2002) (undocumented worker is statutory employee and eligible for medical compensa-
tion, but wage-loss benefits may be suspended due to immigration status); Sanchez v. Eagle
Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510, 514–16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (undocumented worker who
tenders false documents ineligible for workers’ compensation pursuant to state law
‘‘commission of crime’’ exception to coverage).
108 Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (barring
discovery of immigration status in FLSA litigation); Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 78
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same, in litigation of FLSA and Alien Tort Claims Act cases).
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concluded that discovery of immigration status is not relevant at the
merits stage of an unfair labor practice proceeding, and further, that at
the compliance (remedy) proceeding, it is the employer’s burden to
establish an employee’s lack of work authorization to toll the backpay
period.109 Importantly, the Board has already rejected an employer’s
tender of a Social Security Administration ‘‘no-match’’ letter as suffi-
cient to carry this burden.110
Labor and immigration advocates have pursued legislation to ad-
dress the consequences of Hoffman. California enacted a law directing
that state labor and civil rights remedies, ‘‘except any reinstatement
remedy prohibited by federal law, are available to all individuals regard-
less of immigration status.’’111 In 2004, Sen. Ted Kennedy and others
introduced major immigration reform legislation that included a ‘‘Hoff-
man fix.’’112 It is notable, however, that the Hoffman fix was incorporat-
ed in a lengthy immigration bill providing for an expanded guestworker
program and earned legalization—that is, a bill unlikely to be acted on
for several years, as wider debates about comprehensive immigration
reform unfold. The Hoffman fix provision was not, for instance, attached
to a ‘‘must-pass’’ bill essential to the AFL–CIO’s legislative agenda,
suggesting that while the measure has the support of the labor move-
ment, it is not today among its highest priorities.
Finally, labor advocates have sought to attack Hoffman in interna-
tional settings. In October 2002, the AFL–CIO and Confederation of
Mexican Workers filed a complaint with the International Labor Organi-
zation, alleging that the decision impermissibly infringed on workers’
rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to freedom of association.
After reviewing the U.S. government’s response, the ILO concluded that
‘‘the remedial measures left to the NLRB in cases of illegal dismissals of
undocumented workers are inadequate to ensure effective protection
against acts of anti-union discrimination’’ under international law.113
109 Tuv Taam Corp., 340 NLRB No. 86, 2003 WL 22295361 (2003).
110 ‘‘No-match’’ letters are correspondence from the Social Security Administration to
employers ‘‘identifying discrepancies between SSA records’’ and employer payroll tax
filings, which are frequently used by employers as grounds to conclude particular employ-
ees are undocumented. The NLRB rejected an SSA no-match letter as not being ‘‘legally
cognizable evidence regarding the immigration status’’ of listed employees. Id. at 5 & n. 7.
111 Cal. Lab. Code § 1171.5(a) (West 2003); Cal. Civ. Code § 3339(a) (West 2004); Cal.
Govt. Code § 7285(a) (West 2004). All three provisions were amended by enactment of Cal.
Senate Bill 1818, c. 1071.
112 Safe, Orderly, Legal Visas and Enforcement (SOLVE) Act of 2004, S. 2381 (intro-
duced May 2004), H.R. 4262 (introduced May 2004), § 321 (backpay or other monetary
relief for labor or employment violation not to be denied because of employer or employee
INA violation).
113 See Complaints Against the United States by AFL–CIO and Confederation of
Mexican Workers, Case No. 2227, ¶ 610 (2003).
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Advocates also raised objections to the Hoffman opinion at the Inter–
American Court of Human Rights, where in May 2002 the Government
of Mexico had requested an Advisory Opinion whether the Hoffman
decision was consistent with international human rights law. In 2003,
the Inter–American Court advised that under international law, immi-
grant workers, regardless of their status, were entitled to the same basic
labor protections as citizens—including backpay.114 To date, however,
condemnations of U.S. labor policy in international tribunals have pro-
duced little change in the U.S.
It is perhaps hardest to measure the impact of Hoffman on actual
labor organizing campaigns. Pragmatic labor organizers and employers
know that even for citizen workers, the Board can rarely provide prompt
or meaningful redress in the event of a legal violation. The loss of
eligibility for backpay, a partial and delayed remedy at best, may not
affect the decision of many undocumented workers whether to partici-
pate in a union campaign. The Hoffman decision ‘‘hinders workers from
coming forward, but the real problem is employer sanctions’’ and the
inability to secure reinstatement, observed one long-time labor organizer
who, as an undocumented restaurant worker himself, once received an
NLRB backpay award in the pre-IRCA era.115 Even before Hoffman,
unauthorized workers faced the risk of job loss and deportation, without
possibility of reinstatement.116 Yet, although undocumented workers
were entitled to full NLRA remedies in the mid–1980’s, the situation of
immigrant workers was not a priority for the mainstream labor move-
ment. Following Hoffman, however, the leadership of organized labor,
especially those have embraced the cause of undocumented workers,
have no choice but to address the reality of non-citizens in the work-
place. Labor now must confront the fact that there are now two sets of
rules for workers, one that provides full remedies and full deterrence to
protect citizens and legal immigrants, and one that provides few reme-
dies and no meaningful protection for undocumented, low-wage workers.
Conclusion
Hoffman did not break new doctrinal or theoretical ground. Nor is it
likely significantly to affect labor or immigration jurisprudence general-
ly. Rather than harmonizing the two statutory regimes, the majority
concluded that immigration policies, as divined by five justices, trump
labor policies. In many ways the opinion appears anachronistic, out of
step with a trend toward deeper integration of regional, if not global,
114 Advisory Opinion No. 18, Inter–American Court of Human Rights (Sept. 2003).
115 Telephone Interview with Wing Lam, Executive Director, Chinese Staff & Workers
Association, July 22, 2004.
116 Telephone Interview with Muzaffar Chishti, June 3, 2004.
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labor markets. It is also out of step with emerging norms of international
labor law and human rights, as reflected in the critical appraisals issued
by the ILO and Inter–American Court.
Nor is the opinion certain to endure. With the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the AFL–CIO now united in opposition to IRCA’s em-
ployer sanctions provisions, there is a real prospect that the prohibition
on employment of unauthorized immigrants may be lifted before long,
perhaps as part of another grand bargain on comprehensive immigration
reform. Beyond repeal of employer sanctions, the interest of the business
community in expanding guestworker programs, and its growing recog-
nition of the inefficiencies of maintaining a vast transnational under-
ground economy, together with the AFL–CIO’s commitment to the cause
of undocumented workers, have increased the prospects for broader
reforms affecting immigrant workers. Behind the current policy discus-
sions, too, looms the interest of both political parties in cultivating
support among Latino voters. And there are national security consider-
ations now as well, which favor creating a path to lawful status that will
encourage undocumented immigrants to come forward, ‘‘instead of the
current situation in which millions of people are unknown, unknown to
the law.’’117
But whatever the prospects for eventual reform, in the meantime
Hoffman seems likely to embolden unscrupulous employers who would
hire and exploit unauthorized immigrants, resulting in more unfair
competition for businesses that play by the rules, lower terms and
conditions of employment for citizens and legal immigrants, and an
intensification of the ‘‘magnet’’ effect against which Congress legislated
in 1986. For the Hoffman majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
reassuringly that immunity from backpay liability ‘‘does not mean the
employer gets off scot-free,’’118 because employers of undocumented
workers remain subject to cease-and-desist orders and notice-posting
requirements. To millions of workers in this country like Jose Castro,
who labor under a different set of workplace rules, those words are of
little comfort.
117 President George W. Bush, New Temporary Worker Program: Remarks on Immi-
gration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004) (transcript available at ¢http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2004/01/20040107–3.html$).
118 535 U.S. at 152.
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